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I. INTRODUCTION
“Quality health care no longer requires a health care provider and a
patient to be in the same room at the same time.”1  Apparently, with the
introduction of telemedicine in schools—enabling physicians to treat and
diagnose patients from hundreds of miles away through video conferencing
technology2—a child’s parent does not need to be in the room either.3 
Imagine Grace, a ten-year-old fourth grader, whose mother signed a form
at the beginning of the school year permitting Grace to receive telemedicine 
services while at school.  Months later, Grace is at school and experiences 
itching and discomfort in her genital area.4 Grace’s teacher, noticing 
Grace’s discomfort, escorts her to the school nurse. The nurse believes Grace 
might have a yeast infection or some other rash,5 and contacts a doctor Grace 
has never met before to conduct a visual exam of Grace’s genital area via
telemedicine.  The exam, which takes place in the school nurse’s office, 
requires Grace to undress while the nurse uses a camera to transmit live video 
to the doctor.  After a ten-minute examination, the doctor assures the nurse
that Grace is fine and sends her back to class.
Grace’s mother learns about the examination from Grace after school
and is outraged by what she feels is an invasion of Grace’s privacy.
Moreover, she believes the exam is a violation of her own right to consent 
to and manage Grace’s medical treatment.  Grace’s mother claims that she 
never would have signed the medical treatment form permitting such 
personal inspections without prior notification from the school.  Parental 
1. Meeting the Health Care Needs of California’s Children: The Role of Telemedicine, 
CHILDREN’S P’SHIP 1 (Mar. 2008), http://www.childrenspartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/06/Meeting-the-Health-Care-Needs-of-Californias-Children%E2%80%94The-Role-of-
Telemedicine_March-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K5M-DWXQ]. 
2. “Telemedicine” and “telehealth” have been used interchangeably. However,
telemedicine “refers specifically to the provision of health care services and education over 
a distance, through the use of telecommunications technology[,]” while “[t]elehealth is a 
broad term used to refer to the provision of health care services, health care education and
health information services at a distance.” Telehealth, Telecare and Telemedicine. . .What’s the 
Difference?, GLOBALMED, http://archive-com.com/page/2998316/2013-10-10/http://www. global 
med.com/additional-resources/telehealth-telecare-and-telemedicine-whats-the-difference. 
php (last visited July 29, 2016). 
3. Georgia Partnership for Telehealth Joins GaHIN to Improve Care at School 
Clinics, GA. HEALTH INFO. NETWORK (June 3, 2015) [hereinafter Georgia Telehealth],
http://www.gahin.org/media/press-release/georgia-partnership-telehealth-joins-gahin-improve-
care-school-clinics [https://perma.cc/44GT-CCBS].
4. Although Grace’s character is hypothetical, her experience is not. See Hearring
v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d 275, 277 (6th Cir. 2013). 
5. For more information on telemedicine providers that solicit the diagnosis and
treatment of yeast infections and UTI’s see Tele-Urology, TELESPECIALISTS, http://www.
tele-specialists.com/tele-urology.php [https://perma.cc/XX7G-8XTA] (last visited July 29, 
2016). 
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consent to these specific telemedicine services is foundational to children’s 
Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches,6 and to 
parents’ rights under substantive due process provided by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.7  Current state laws, however, do not adequately protect these 
rights.
Questions of parental consent regarding school-based telemedicine services 
have been asked and unanswered.8  As schools implement telemedicine 
programs, they greatly expand the range and type of health care services
offered to children.9  The issue of consent arises because—before a child 
may receive any telemedicine services—parents must sign consent forms 
that are vague, ambiguous, and do not adequately describe or anticipate 
the broad scope and type of medical services that may be administered to 
students. Because the consent forms are vague, parents are under-informed
about what types of services may in fact be provided to their children.  As 
this Comment will address, providing medical services that reach beyond 
parental consent raises multiple constitutional issues. 
This Comment advocates for a uniform state-by-state regulation, requiring 
schools to obtain parental consent immediately before any telemedicine 
service is provided to their children at school.  Alternatively, the constitutional
issues could be eliminated if telemedicine consent forms enumerate a
finite and limited list of what medical services may be provided. These
reforms will ensure not only that parents’ and children’s constitutional rights
are protected, but also that schools and doctors provide the most informed
health care services.  Part II describes a background of school-based health, 
as well as the benefits and risks of offering telemedicine in schools.  Part
III explains the Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right of parents to 
6. See Hearring, 712 F.3d 275, 281–83 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that a school nurse 
who conducted a visual exam of a six year-old student’s genitals was entitled to qualified 
immunity because existing precedent did not warn the nurse that her medical assessments
were subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
8. See Bradley J. Kaspar, Legislating for a New Age in Medicine: Defining the 
Telemedicine Standard of Care to Improve Healthcare in Iowa, 99 IOWA L. REV. 839, 842
(2014) (“What risks associated with telemedicine does the physician need to disclose to
the patientor the child’s guardian in this examplebefore treating her?”); Tara Garcia 
Mathewson, Privacy Laws Could See Overhaul on Campuses, EDUC. DIVE (July 2, 2015), 
http://www.educationdive.com/news/privacy-laws-could-see-overhaul-on-campuses/
401192/ [https://perma.cc/RP9P-JK43].









   






      
 






   
     
   
     
 
  
    
   
 
  
     
  
control and manage the health care of their minor children, and the Fourth 
Amendment right of children to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  Part IV argues that states that do not require immediate parental
consent before providing telemedicine services violate the Constitution 
because telemedicine parental consent forms are too vague and ambiguous 
and therefore do not adequately protect the rights of parents to control the
medical care of their children.  The section compares various state laws and 
regulations regarding telemedicine and highlights the lack of legislation
protecting the right of parents to consent to medical treatment. 
This Comment ultimately argues that states should implement a uniform 
standard that requires schools to contact parents immediately before
administering any telemedicine services, or alternatively, that requires states 
to provide telemedicine consent forms with a restricted, limited list of
telemedicine services that the school may provide.
II. SCHOOL-BASED TELEMEDICINE
The use of medicine in schools began in 1903 with the goal of managing 
contagious conditions that kept children out of school.10  The nation’s first 
school nurse, Lina Suthers, asserted that the goal of school medicine was 
“keeping the children in the classroom and under treatment.”11  Since then, 
the primary purpose of school medicine has been to ensure immunization 
compliance, screen for vision and hearing impairments, and refer students 
to physicians for diagnosis and prescriptions for other illnesses.12  Over
time, case law, legislation, and other regulations have expanded the kind
and range of health care available at school.13  Generally, teachers and other 
qualified school personnel may administer prescription medication to a 
student only with previously written parental consent.14  Many states also 
10. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., CHARTING NURSING’S FUTURE 2–3 (Aug. 2010), 
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2010/rwjf64263 [https:// perma.cc/ 
533P-KJ3D].  Other articles have cited the beginning of school medicine as 1902. Sarah D.
Cohn, Legal Issues in School Nursing Practice, 12 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 219 (1984). 
11. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., supra note 10, at 3. 
12. Id. at 2. 
13. See Charles J. Russo & David A. Dolph, School Nurses: On the Front Line of 
Keeping Students Healthy, 293 EDUC. LAW REP. 1 (2013) (discussing how the responsibilities 
of school nurses have changed over time). 
14. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49423 (West 2016) (permitting school personnel 
to assist students in the administration of an epinephrine prescription so long as there is 
written statements from the doctor and parent authorizing such assistance); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 28A.210.260 (West 2016) (authorizing school nurses and other trained personnel
to administer specified medications, so long as the “public school district or private school
is in receipt of a written, current and unexpired request from a parent”); Am. Nurses Ass’n 
v. Torlakson, 304 P.3d 1038, 1041 (Cal. 2013). 
748
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require parental consent each time the school nurse administers over-the-
counter medication such as Advil or Tylenol.15 
The role of school-based health care has expanded dramatically with 
the introduction of telemedicine.16  Telemedicine is a method of providing
medical services by connecting health care providers and patients using 
two-way video, e-mail, phones, and other forms of communication technology.17 
The development of telemedicine launched with the space program in the 
1960s, when The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
began using telemedicine to monitor the medical condition of astronauts.18 
Today, there are approximately 200 telemedicine networks, providing
services in over half of United States hospitals,19 as well as schools, nursing 
homes, assisted living facilities, prisons, and many other patient sites.20 
Market research organizations have found that the telemedicine market 
growth rate has risen between 18%–30 % per year, and anticipate that the 
market will grow from 9.6 billion dollars in 2013 to 38.5 billion dollars in
2018.21  However, telemedicine laws and regulations have struggled to keep
up with the rapid growth.22
 15. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 610-X-7-.02 (2016) (“Over-the-counter (OTC) 
medications may be administered to school children by the school nurse with a parent’s 
written authorization . . . .”).  Some parents have highlighted the inconvenience of regulations
that require parental consent every time before an over-the-counter drug, such as Tylenol 
or Advil is administered. See Lisa Belkin, Sending Drugs to School with Your Child, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2009, 1:06 PM), http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/sending-
drugs-to-school-with-your-child/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PSL9-PNH6].
16. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. NURSES, supra note 9.
 17. What Is Telemedicine?, AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, http://www.americantele 
med.org/about-telemedicine/what-is-telemedicine#.VgbYxelSzzI [https://perma.cc/YMZ9-
QA7H] (last visited July 29, 2016); see, e.g., Abby Goodnough, Modern Doctors’ House 
Calls: Skype Chat and Fast Diagnosis, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2015, at A1. 
18. Patricia C. Kuszler, Telemedicine and Integrated HealthCare Delivery: Compounding 
Malpractice Liability, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 297, 300 (1999). 
19. Telemedicine Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, 
http://www.americantelemed.org/about-telemedicine/faqs#.Vd936-lSzzI [https://perma.cc/
67J7-U4LT] (last visited July 29, 2016). 
20. Ryan J. Spaulding, Gary Doolittle & Deborah L. Swirczynski, School-Based 
Telehealth, in TELEMEDICINE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DOCUMENTS 267, 267 (Joseph Tracey
ed., 2004), https://www.nachc.com/client/getting.started.telemedicine.pdf. 
21. Krista Drobac, 2015: Another Unstoppable Year for Telehealth, INSTITUTE FOR 
HEALTH CARE CONSUMERISM, http://www.theihcc.com/en/communities/health_access_ 
alternatives/2015-another-unstoppable-year-for-telehealth_i7gjbohl.html [https://perma.cc/
F63S-XSCE] (last visited July 29, 2016). 
22. Virginia Rowthorn & Diane Hoffman, Legal Impediments to the Diffusion of
Telemedicine, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 42 (2011) (“Telemedicine is moving ahead
 749








      








   






   
 
   
  
  
     
     
  
 
   
   
  




   
  
   
 
    
In February 1998, TeleKidcare, a Kansas-based program out of the 
University of Kansas Medical School, became one of the first programs to
provide telemedicine services in school health centers, marking the beginning 
of the expansion of school-based medical care.23  From the program’s start, 
TeleKidcare trained school nurses on the uses and protocols of telemedicine
and linked those nurses with off-site physicians who provided the medical
consultations for students.24 Closely reflecting the creed of the nation’s
first school nurse,25 advocates of school-based telemedicine state that
the goal of telemedicine in schools is “to improve the seat time—the time 
spent learning in the classroom—and not being out for the doctor’s
appointments.”26 
Since the TeleKidcare pilot program, telemedicine has rapidly expanded in
elementary, middle and high schools for a number of reasons.27 Today,
there are about twenty-five telemedicine programs that partner primary and 
secondary schools with local medical schools and hospitals, serving hundreds
of schools across the country.28  The development and cost-efficiency of 
technology has made telemedicine equipment more economically practical 
for schools to purchase and use.29  Policy makers have also enthusiastically 
promoted telemedicine in schools because of a growing national sentiment
that embraces and advocates health care as a social right.30  In response to 
this sentiment, policy makers, politicians, and foundations have placed high 
importance on providing medical access to children who otherwise have
little or no access to it.31  These efforts have been directed not only towards 
on many fronts – the technology is there, the willingness of practitioners to provide and
patients to accept telemedicine is there, and even the funding is there.  However, in some
ways, the law is not there.”).
23.  Spaulding et al., supra note 20, at 270–71. 
24. Gary C. Doolittle, Arthur R. Williams & David J. Cook, An Estimation of Costs 
of a Pediatric Telemedicine Practice in Public Schools, 41 MED. CARE 100, 101 (2003). 
25. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., supra note 10, at 2.
 26. Eric Wicklund, Taking Telemedicine to School, MOBI HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 25,
2015), http://mobihealthnews.com/news/taking-telemedicine-school [https://perma.cc/JL7H-
UM83].
27.  Doolittle et al., supra note 24, at 101. 
 28. Hallie Levine Sklar, Telemedicine In Schools, PARENTS, http://www.parents.com/
health/doctors/telemedicine-in-schools/ [https://perma.cc/QF75-RHNM] (last visited July
29, 2016); see also Adam Rubenfire, Texas Allows Medicaid Funding for School Telemedicine
Visits, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/ 
20150828/NEWS/150829932 [https://perma.cc/WJE2-ZYBL].
29. See Sklar, supra note 28. 
30.  Doolittle, et al., supra note 24, at 101. 
31. See Lindsey Leininger & Helen Levy, Child Health and Access to Medical
Care, 25 FUTURE CHILD. 65, 79 (2015); see also CHILDREN’S P’SHIP, supra note 1, at 11
(“[T]here has been particular attention paid in the last couple of years to increasing access 
to health care for children by decreasing the number of uninsured children and by increasing
750
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rural children who live in geographically isolated areas, but also towards
children who live in overpopulated urban areas and are unable to receive 
regular medical treatment.32 
Proponents of school-based telemedicine boast of its many benefits and 
its potential to meet the chronic illnesses and the behavioral and mental
health issues that face many families today.33  Indeed, numerous reports
show that children are unhealthier today than ever before.34  These reports
advocate for affordable and accessible health care to combat the significant 
increase in children with chronic diseases such as obesity, asthma, and
behavioral and developmental disorders such as autism and attention deficit
disorder.35 
One of the primary benefits associated with school-based telemedicine 
is the reduced amount of time parents must miss work to drive their children
to the doctor’s office.36  In current school-based programs, schools simply
require parents to sign a general consent form at the beginning of the 
school year, allowing their child to participate in the telemedicine program.37 
Many advocates of school-based telemedicine programs tell stories of
children with working parents, who, because of telemedicine programs in
schools, can Skype with a physician while sitting in the school nurse’s office.38 
The school nurse and telemedicine physician may test the child for strep, 
the number of and capacity of school-based health centers. . . . Telemedicine can also help
school-based health centers meet the health care needs of the children they serve.”). 
32. See Doolittle et al., supra note 24, at 101. 
33. AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, MEDICAID BEST PRACTICE SCHOOL-BASED TELEHEALTH
2 (July 2013), http://www.amdtelemedicine.com/telemedicine-resources/documents/ATAstate-
medicaid-best-practice-school-based-telehealth.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JWD-QPQY]. 
34. The Health-e-Access Telemedicine Program, ASS’N OF MATERNAL & CHILD
HEALTH PROGRAMS 1–2 (2011), http://www.amchp.org/programsandtopics/BestPractices/ 
InnovationStation/ISDocs/Health-e-access-program.pdf. 
35. CHILDREN’S P’SHIP, supra note 1, at 1. 
36. Georgia Telehealth, supra note 3 (“Students receive quality care without having
to miss class.  Parents don’t have to leave work and lose wages to take their child to see 
the doctor. If a specialist visit is needed, it doesn’t require hours in the car to reach a large 
healthcare center; the child can be examined right from the school clinic.”). For a discussion 
on the stress employed parents experience while managing a child’s chronic illness, see 
Debra A. Major, Utilizing Role Theory to Help Employed Parents Cope with Children’s 
Chronic Illness, 18 HEALTH EDUC. RES. 45, 54 (2003). 
37. See infra p. 759 and note 90. 
38. See Marsha Sills, Telemedicine Clinic at Carencro School Helps Keep Students




















    
   
 
     
    








     
 
    
 
    
 
 
      
diagnose and manage the child’s asthma, and prescribe medications without 
making a parent miss work to drive the child to the doctor’s office.39 
While the current and potential benefits of telemedicine are many, critics 
have voiced concerns and questions over potential issues in school-based 
services.40  The main concern, raised by policy makers and health care providers, 
and the focal issue of this Comment, is the issue of parental consent.41 
Providing telemedicine services in school nurses’ offices augments the
traditional role and scope of school medicine.42  Bringing telemedicine to 
schools has the effect of requiring school health personnel to assist in the
diagnosis of illnesses and diseases, assist with mental health treatment,
and participate in follow-up care—medical services that have traditionally 
fallen outside the scope of school-based medicine.43  With such a dramatic 
expansion of services offered at the school, parents may not fully understand 
the wide range of medical services schools now offer when they sign
vague forms permitting their child to receive telemedicine treatment at the 
beginning of the school year.44
 39. See Kasper, supra note 8, at 841, 858; see also CHILDREN’S P’SHIP, supra note 
1, at 2.
40. The National Association of School Nurses acknowledges that schools face many
challenges in successfully implementing telemedicine services, including patient confidentiality,
documentation processes, coordination of services, and many others.  See NAT’L ASS’N OF
SCH. NURSES, supra note 9. Some of these concerns include the risk that the treating
physicians are not typically the child’s primary care doctor, and will be treating the child
without a full health history or current list of the child’s allergies.  Susan D. Hall, New Texas
Law Supports School-Based Telemedicine, FIERCE HEALTHCARE (Aug. 24, 2015, 10:31 AM), 
http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/it/new-texas-law-supports-school-based-telemedicine [https://
perma.cc/ZE6U-SM7M].
41. See Alana Rocha, Justin Dehn & Edgar Walters, Law Could Bring Remote Doctor
Visits to Schools, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 23, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/ 08/23/law-
could-bring-remote-doctor-visits-schools/# [https://perma.cc/FLP7-J693]; Hall, supra note 40; 
NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. NURSES, supra note 9.
 42. See Spaulding et al., supra note 20, at 304; see NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. NURSES,
supra note 9.
 43. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. NURSES, supra note 9. School nurses have traditionally
served students by administering medication and first aid, ensuring immunization compliance, 
screening for vision and hearing impairments, and referring students to physicians. See
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., supra note 10, at 2–3. 
44. See Hall, supra note 40 (“[P]arents who will be required to sign myriad consent 
forms at the beginning of the school year might not fully understand what they’re permitting.”).
752
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III. PARENTAL CONSENT AND MINORS’ HEALTH CARE 





There are many positive benefits to parents being involved in their child’s
medical care and education.45  Studies have found that parental engagement 
in medical decision-making may lower instances of children’s hospitalization 
and the cost of medical care,46 and reduce the effects and prevalence of 
chronic illnesses such as obesity.47  On the other hand, studies have found
that parents who are not as actively engaged in communicating with their 
child’s physician may experience a sense of diminished empowerment in
their role of providing and caring for their child.48 
The Constitution protects the right of parents to consent to the medical
treatment of their children,49 and a violation of that right is relevant under
both the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.50 Under substantive due process,51 the United States Supreme
Court has consistently upheld parents’ rights to control the education, 
medical care, and general upbringing of their child,52 justified by the belief 
that parents act in the best interest of their child.53  The Court has held that
“the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
 45. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &PREVENTION, PARENT ENGAGEMENT:STRATEGIES
FOR INVOLVING PARENTS IN SCHOOL 6–7, 14, 24 (2012).
46. See Kerry Grens, Decision Sharing Tied to Lower Cost for Kids’ Care, REUTERS
(Dec. 21, 2011, 1:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/us-decision-sharing-
tied-idUSTRE7BK1MS20111221 [https://perma.cc/KNN2-TLT2]; see also CHILDREN’S 
P’SHIP, supra note 1, at 5, 8 (reporting that in a New York study, ninety-four percent of
children’s chronic illness problems would have led to an emergency room or doctor’s office
visit children if not managed by telemedicine). 
47. See Ana C. Lindsay et al., The Role of Parents in Preventing Childhood Obesity, 
16 FUTURE CHILD. 169, 175 (2006). 
48. Major, supra note 36, at 54. 
49. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
50. See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1222 (10th Cir. 2003). 
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
52. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35; Meyer, 262 U.S.
at 399. 
53. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (noting the right arises from
“traditional presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their child.”).  However, 
the doctrine of parens patriae embodies the principle that the state has an obligation to protect
those minor children who cannot protect themselves.  Christine M. Hanisco, Acknowledging 
the Hypocrisy: Granting Minors the Right to Choose Their Medical Treatment, 16 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 899, 904–05 (2000). 
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fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody 
and control of their children.”54  However, the Court has never defined the
precise scope of a parent’s right to direct their child’s medical care.55  The
Court acknowledged that like most rights, a parent’s right to direct the 
medical care of their child is not absolute.56 
There are exceptions to the general rule that parents must provide consent 
for their child’s medical treatment.  For example, many states have enacted
laws that enable minors to seek medical advice treatment relating to pregnancy,
abortions, sexually transmitted diseases, and counseling and treatment for 
drug and alcohol abuse.57  Additionally, a state may take medical custody of 
a child whose parents refuse to consent to life-saving medical treatment.58 
When state actors violate a parent’s right to consent to the medical
treatment of their child, that parent may bring two constitutional causes 
of action: first, under substantive due process; and second, on behalf of 
their child’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.59 
Although the traditional cases involving Fourth Amendment searches arise 
from searches conducted by law enforcement or in criminal investigations,
the Court has also extended the right to protect people from unreasonable 
invasions of privacy during medical examinations.  In Dubbs v. Head Start, 
the Court explained: 
The focus of the [Fourth] Amendment is thus on the security of the person, not 
the identity of the searcher or the purpose of the search.  The Supreme Court has
posed the Fourth Amendment inquiry in terms of whether the governmental conduct 
at issue compromises “an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
consider reasonable.”60
 54. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66. 
55. See James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the 
Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371 (1994). 
56. Lee Black, Limiting Parent’s Rights in Medical Decision Making, 8 AMA J.
ETHICS 678, 679 (2006) (citing Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 1979)). 
57. For example, California Family Code section 6926 provides that children over
the age of twelve “may consent to medical care related to the diagnosis or treatment of [a]
disease” as it relates to drug problems or sexually transmitted diseases. CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 6926 (West 2012); see also Cara D. Watts, Asking Adolescents: Does a Mature Minor 
Have a Right to Participate in Health Care Decisions?, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 221, 
223 (2005); Maya Manian, Functional Parenting and Dysfunctional Abortion Policy:
Reforming Parental Involvement Legislation, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 241, 242 (2012). 
58. Jennifer E. Chen, Family Conflicts: The Role of Religion in Refusing Medical
Treatment for Minors, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 655 (2007) (“[W]here parents assert the right 
of refusal, the decision seems to turn on a number of factors relating to the strength of the 
state’s interest which includes the danger to the child, the potential success of the treatment 
being refused, and the danger to others in the case of communicable diseases.”).
59. See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 2003); Hearring
v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d 275, 281–82 (6th Cir. 2013). 
60. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1206 (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987)).
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Federal appellate courts have found that when a child’s Fourth Amendment 
right is violated, parents have standing to bring a claim on behalf of that 
child.61  Although the Fourth Amendment protects any individual from 
unreasonable searches by public employees,62 it is well-established that a
search performed with valid consent is constitutionally permissible.63 
Because parents, not the children themselves, hold the right to consent to
the medical treatment of their minor children, the Fourth Amendment
requires an analysis of whether parental consent exists regarding a minor’s
medical treatment.64  Therefore, a parent’s consent, or lack thereof, is critical
to analyzing whether a child’s Fourth Amendment right is violated.65 
Before proceeding, it is important to distinguish the type of “parental 
consent” protected under the constitution from the type of “informed consent” 
that state laws currently regulate.66 These two types of consent, while related 
in the medical decision-making process, are distinct in both their requirements
and application.  “Parental Consent,” as analyzed in this Comment under
Constitutional standards, may also fairly be described as parental permission.67 
It requires that parents give physicians permission to provide treatment for 
their child.68  On the other hand, “informed consent” is a technical term that
requires a physician to explain in great detail the nature of the patient’s 
illness or condition, the risks and potential benefits in different treatment
alternatives, and the probability of the different treatment success rates.69 
Informed consent is required in all medical contexts, whereas this Comment
discusses the type of parental consent analogous to “parental permission.” 
61. See id. at 1204. 
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1984)
(“[The Fourth Amendment’s]  prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies 
to searches conducted by public school officials.”). 
63. See U.S. v. Soriano, 361 F.3d 494, 501 (9th Cir. 2004); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1201. 
64. See Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1207. 
65. Id.
 66. See Ingrid Dreezen, Telemedicine and Informed Consent, 23 MED. & L. 541, 542– 
43 (2004). 
67. See, e.g., Marcela G. del Carmen & Steven Joffe, Informed Consent for Medical
Treatment and Research: A Review, 10 ONCOLOGIST 636, 640 (2005); Committee on Bioethics,
Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS
314 (1995).
68. See del Carmen & Joffe, supra note 67, at 640. 
69.  Committee on Bioethics, supra note 67, at 314. 
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Some states specify an additional type of “informed consent” required
for telemedicine services.70  The 2015 annual report from the Center for
Connected Health Policy notes that twenty-nine states have regulations
regarding informed consent for telemedicine services in their statutes,
administrative codes or Medicaid policies.71  In addition to traditional informed
consent laws, the Federation of State Medical Boards advises states to
adopt informed consent statements directly relating to the additional risks
inherent in the practice of electronic medicine.72  Although many state codes 
and regulations mandate that a physician explain these risks to their patients, 
it is questionable how physicians might satisfy these requirements in the
school-based setting, and how the requirements meet Constitutional standards, 
when a parent is neither present nor contacted for the child’s treatment. 
IV. GAPS IN REGULATION: TELEMEDICINE AND PARENTAL CONSENT
Telemedicine regulation is a patchwork of education, Medicaid, Medicare, 
and physician licensing laws.73  Between January 2015 and July 2015,
forty- two states introduced over 200 separate pieces of legislation relating 
to telemedicine.74  However, none of this legislation specifically required 
telemedicine providers to obtain parental consent immediately before
administering telemedicine services.
Due to the lack of legislation, schools that ask parents to sign ambiguous
parental consent forms at the beginning of the school year and require no 
further consent for telemedicine treatment may technically comply with 
general state law, yet still violate parents’ constitutional rights.  Current
 70. See Rowthorn & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 36–37 (discussing California’s 
telemedicine informed consent statute and the problems surrounding it).  However, some
health policy groups advocate that these informed consent requirements should be repealed. 
CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, ADVANCING CALIFORNIA’S LEADERSHIP IN TELEHEALTH
POLICY 12, 37 (Feb. 2011), http://cchpca.org/sites/default/files/resources/Telehealth%20 
Model%20Statute%20Report%202-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W4U-HR4K] [hereinafter 
CAL. TELEHEALTH REPORT].
71. See  CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, STATE TELEHEALTH LAWS AND 
MEDICAID PROGRAM POLICIES (July 2015), http://cchpca.org/sites/default/files/resources/ 
STATE%20TELEHEALTH%20POLICIES%20AND%20REIMBURSEMENT%20REP 
ORT%20FINAL%20%28c%29%20JULY%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP7A-8BTS]
[hereinafter 50 STATE TELEHEALTH REPORT].
72. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., MODEL POLICY FOR THE APPROPRIATE USE OF
TELEMEDICINE TECHNOLOGIES IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 5 (Apr. 2014),  http://www. 
fsmb.org/Media/Default/PDF/FSMB/Advocacy/FSMB_Telemedicine_Policy.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K76C-625J].
73. See Hilary Daniel & Lois Snyder Sulmasy, Policy Recommendations to Guide 
the Use of Telemedicine in Primary Care Settings, 163 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 787, 793 
(2015).
74. CAL. TELEHEALTH REPORT, supra note 70. 
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state telemedicine laws and regulations that do not specifically require 
parental consent for telemedicine services do not adequately protect parents’
substantive due process rights and students’ Fourth Amendment rights. 
A. Telemedicine Laws: State-by-State Analysis 
There is currently no state legislation requiring schools to contact parents
immediately before telemedicine services are provided.  This failure runs 
the risk that public schools, nurses, and doctors are violating parents’ due 
process rights and their children’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
Most states derive their telemedicine and school-based health care 
regulations from their Medicaid laws.75  One of the more recent Medicaid 
legislative developments to expand telemedicine in public schools is Texas 
House Bill 1878. The bill, enacted September 2015, regulates when Medicaid 
may cover and reimburse telemedicine services provided in public schools.76 
After several drafts and revisions, the bill passed with a unanimous vote.77 
The final draft added a section mandating that Medicaid could cover
telemedicine services only if  “[t]he parent or legal guardian of the patient
provides consent before the service is provided.”78  The Texas bill is the
only state legislation that requires parental consent for telemedicine treatment
provided at schools, yet nonetheless fails to require that the parents give 
consent immediately before the treatment is provided.79  Notably, parental
consent is only required for telemedicine services covered by Medicaid, 
yet does not address parental consent standards for telemedicine services
not reimbursed by Medicaid.80  Nonetheless, such legislation demonstrates
policy makers’ awareness of the need for parental consent. 
Nebraska’s legislative history illustrates an unsuccessful attempt to pass
school-based telemedicine laws. In 2013, the Nebraska Legislature introduced 
Legislative Bill 556, which originally included authorization for school-
based telemedicine.81  As introduced, the bill stated that “[p]roviding 
75. See 50 STATE TELEHEALTH REPORT, supra note 71.
 76. See H.B. 1878, 84th Leg., 2015 Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015) (codified at TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 531.0217 (West 2016). 
77. See Record Vote Taken, TEX. LEGISLATURE ONLINE, http://www.legis.state.
tx.us/BillLookup/RecordVote.aspx?LegSess=84R&Bill=HB1878&RcdVtNo=794&Ch=
H&Dt=05/08/2015 (last visited July 29, 2016). 
78.  Tex. H.B. 1878. 
79. See 50 STATE TELEHEALTH REPORT, supra note 71, at 191.
 80. See Tex. H.B. 1878. 
81.  Legis. B. 556, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013). 
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centralized telehealth medical and behavioral health services for children 
in public schools will help parents access health care for their school 
children; . . . [p]roviding such services will allow the parents and child to 
see, hear, and interact with a physician or behavioral health professional[.]”82 
Although the bill encouraged parents to be involved in the treatment of 
their children, it had no language requiring parents to consent to telemedicine 
services. In a Senate floor debate, proponents of the bill acknowledged 
that: 
Some parents have expressed concern that this bill aims to circumvent parental
authority and judgment.  I want to clarify that that is not the intent. This bill does not
change the requirement that parents must consent to all medical treatment. Parents
have also expressed concerns that physicians, schools, children, and parents would
be required to participate in telehealth . . . .83 
Although Senator McGill acknowledged that parents must still consent 
to all medical treatment, the bill provided no textual assurance of such.
Ultimately, the sections of the bill that authorized school-based telemedicine
were completely eliminated and the bill was signed into law without reference
to school-based telemedicine.84  As a result, Nebraska currently has no 
legislation that allows telemedicine in schools.85 
Georgia is another state that has pioneered the adoption of telemedicine
regulations. Georgia enacted its Telemedicine Act in 2005, which requires 
every health policy to include payment for telemedicine services.86 The 
Official Code of Georgia authorizes telemedicine in schools, provided 
that: 
82. Id. 
83. Hearing on Legis. B. 556 Before the Health & Human Servs. Comm. 103d Leg., 
1st Sess., 10 (2013) (statement of Sen. Amanda McGill), http://www.legislature.ne.gov/ 
FloorDocs/103/PDF/Transcripts/Health/2013-02-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ER3-X374]. 
84. AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, supra note 33, at 3.
85. Nebraska law outlines mandatory and optional coverage for many health care
services, but telemedicine is not among them.  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-911(1)–(2)
(West 2016).  Nebraska’s telehealth laws do not address school-based use of telemedicine. 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-8506 (West 2016). However, Nebraska does provide rules
and regulations regarding oral and dental telemedicine use and references “charitable oral 
health services” provided to schools.  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 85-1414.01(3) (West 2016). 
86. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-56.4(b)(1) (2010). 
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A Georgia licensed physician, physician assistant, or advanced practice registered
nurse . . . [i]s providing medical care by electronic or other such means at the
request of a . . . Public School Nurse . . .  and the physician . . .  is able to examine the 
patient using technology and peripherals that are equal or superior to an examination
done personally by a provider within that provider’s standard of care[.]87 
Parental consent to medical treatment is not addressed in Georgia’s
regulations or statutory law, but can be found in Georgia’s Medicaid
Telemedicine Handbook.88  In order to be eligible for Medicaid reimbursement 
and coverage, the handbook requires that “[i]f the member is a minor 
child, a parent/guardian must present the child for telemedicine services
and sign the consent form unless otherwise exempted by State or Federal
law. The parent/guardian need not attend the telemedicine session unless
attendance is therapeutically appropriate.”89  This parental consent provision
provided in the handbook is vague and ambiguous.  It fails to provide any
explanation of how a parent may “present the child for telemedicine services,”
or what presenting the child practically requires.90  It may require a parent 
to physically bring their child to the place where they will receive telemedicine 
services, or perhaps in the school-based context, simply require a parent
to give permission before the telemedicine services are provided. However 
the conjunctive clause, “and sign the consent form,” seems to suggest that 
signing a consent form in and of itself is not enough.91  The parent must 
make some present, affirmative action by presenting the child for telemedicine 
services at the time the child needs the services, rather than simply signing 
a consent form at the beginning of the school year.  Furthermore, it is 
87. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 360-3-.07 (2013). 
88. GA. DEP’T OF CMTY. HEALTH, GEORGIA MEDICAID TELEMEDICINE HANDBOOK 5 
(Jan. 2016), https://www.mmis.georgia.gov/portal/Portals/0/StaticContent/Public/ALL/ 
HANDBOOKS/Telemedicine%20Handbook%20JAN%202016%2004-01-2016%20142436.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9FNG-3ASR].
89. Id. at 4–5.  A similar Nebraska statute does not address school-based telemedicine
specifically, but states that when providing mental health services to a child, “[i]n cases in 
which there is a threat that the child may harm himself or herself or others, before an initial
telehealth service the health care practitioner shall work with the child and his or her parent 
or guardian to develop a safety plan[,]” therefore requiring that the parent participate in 
the telemedicine mental health services when appropriate.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-8509(b)
(2013).
90. GA. DEP’T OF CMTY. HEALTH, supra note 88, at 5. 
91. Id.
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uncertain what kind of services fall under the “therapeutically appropriate”
requirement.92 
An analysis of telemedicine laws in Texas, Nebraska, and Georgia
demonstrates those Legislatures’ battles to provide and pay for health care
in the school environment without jeopardizing parental rights.  In attempting 
to ensure that children receive medical treatment without requiring a
parent to come to the school and miss work, these states’ laws do not require 
schools to notify parents before or when a child receives services.93  The
very policies that attempt to help parents may actually end up violating 
their constitutional rights. 
Remember ten year-old Grace?  If Grace was a fourth grader in Coffee
County, Georgia, her mother would have signed a consent form permitting 
Grace to receive telemedicine services at any one of Coffee County’s eight 
public elementary schools.94  Coffee County School District partners with 
Emory Medical School to provide telemedicine services to students and 
faculty in Coffee County schools.  The telemedicine consent form Grace’s 
mother would sign is available on the school district’s website.95  The form
requires parents to “authorize any physician or designated health/mental
health professional (nurse practitioners, physician assistants, college student
interns, etc.) working for the clinic to provide such medical tests, procedures, 
and treatments as are reasonably necessary or advisable for the medical
evaluation and management of my child’s health or mental health care.”96 
While the form encourages parents to be present when the child is treated,
the form nonetheless states that “[i]f a parent/guardian cannot be present,
92. School health staff should be able to make accurate assessments of both a
student’s physical and mental health conditions: “[u]nderstanding the relationship between 
frequent health office visits or somatic complaints as a sign of underlying problems, which 
may be organic or psycho-emotional in origin, requires the unique skill set of the school 




93. See Legis. B. 556, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 360-
3-.07 (2013). Opponents to Texas Bill 1878 were concerned that “the bill would not . . . 
specifically require parental notification for treatment. Under the bill, if parents signed a 
form at the beginning of a school year consenting to medical treatment for their child, they
could inadvertently consent to mental health treatment through telemedicine as well.”
TEX. H. RES. ORG., DAILY FLOOR REPORT, 84th Leg. No. 65 at 104–05 (May 7, 2015). 
94. Coffee Telehealth, COFFEE CTY. SCH. SYS., http://www.coffee.k12.ga.us/?Division
ID=16267&ToggleSideNav=ShowAll [https://perma.cc/PAW8-HJDN] (last visited July
29, 2016). 
95. Patient Consent/Refusal Form, COFFEE CTY. SCH. SYS., http://www.coffee. k12. 
ga.us/Default.asp?PN=Forms&L=1&DivisionID=16267&LMID=713413&ToggleSideN
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the child will still be treated.  Someone from the clinic will make contact
with the parent/guardian to inform them of the outcome,” and does not 
specifically state if a child will be treated whether the parent is contacted
or not.97 
While this form may not violate Georgia statutory law, it certainly may
contradict the regulations set out for Medicaid reimbursement.98  If Grace’s 
family was on Medicaid, the services provided to her in the school health 
office may not qualify for Medicaid coverage under Georgia law because
Grace’s mother did not “present” her for medical services and because 
her mother should have arguably been there for therapeutic support. Whether
Grace’s family is under Medicaid or not, the requirements for Medicaid
coverage are not the same as the requirements under state law.  The Coffee
County consent form would not violate Georgia statutory law because the
Georgia Code is silent as to whether parents must give immediate consent to
telemedicine treatment.99  Because Georgia statutory law lends no remedy 
for Grace’s mother’s complaint, her claims would instead be analyzed under 
common law constitutional rights cases like the Tenth Circuit case, Dubbs v.
Head Start.100 
B. Parental Consent and Public School Medical Treatment 
In the 2003 case Dubbs v. Head Start, eight parents brought constitutional
rights claims against the Tulsa, Oklahoma Community Action Project (CAP), 
an organization that oversaw the Head Start preschool their children
attended.101 In that case, a number of preschool children were given full
physical and genital examinations at school by nurses hired by CAP.102 
Before the examinations, administrators of CAP told the two nurses that 
97. Id. 
98. GA. DEP’T OF CMTY. HEALTH, supra note 88.  The schools, while not legally
bound to follow the Medicaid regulations, have a strong interest in doing so.  One of the 
primary obstacles in expanding school-based telemedicine is the lack of funding and 
insurance.  A 2009 report stated that over half of states require some type of Medicaid, 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), or private health insurance to pay telemedicine
physicians.  CHILDREN’S P’SHIP, supra note 1, at 8.  Although many of the school-based
pilot programs are funded by grants, providing Medicaid coverage is key in maintaining
the programs.  Spaulding et al., supra note 20, at 278 (“It is expected that insurance
reimbursement will significantly increase the likelihood of long-term sustainability.”). 
99. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 360-3-.07 (2016). 
100. See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2003). 
101. Id. at 1197. 
102. Id.
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CAP had obtained consent from the parents for the exams, and the nurses 
proceeded with the exams without ever seeing consent forms.103 
The parents brought their claims against both CAP, who authorized the 
exams, and the nurses, who conducted the exams.104  The parents argued
that the examinations violated both the children’s Fourth Amendment
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the parents’ 
substantive due process right to control the care, custody and management
of their children.105  The district court reasoned that under a substantive
due process analysis, the physical examinations did not “shock the conscience 
of the court,”106—the required standard of other Fourteenth Amendment
violations—and granted summary judgment for the CAP administrators
and nurses. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the summary judgment for
the defendants and remanded the case back to the district court.107
 103. See id. at 1199. 
104. Id. at 1197. 
105. Id. at 1201–02. The parents also alleged the same claims under state tort assault 
and battery claims and under the Oklahoma Constitution. Id. at 1218–19.  We might 
consider the reason why a parent would pursue a federal constitutional claim instead of a 
state constitutional claim or tort claim.  Proving and measuring damages under the federal
constitution is different than state torts.  In his article, Anthony DiSaro explains the difficulty
in measuring damages for constitutional violations and explains that “the concept of
compensatory damages under § 1983 should be defined expansively.  An individual who 
is deprived of a constitutional right can seek redress for intangible harms, such as ‘mental
and emotional distress’ or ‘impairment of reputation, . . . personal humiliation, and mental 
anguish and suffering,’ but those injuries cannot be presumed.”  Anthony DiSarro, When
a Jury Can’t Say No: Presumed Damages for Constitutional Torts, 64 RUTGERS L. REV.
333, 356 (2012) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, (1978), and Memphis Cmty. Sch. 
Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986)).  See also John F. Preis, Alternative State
Remedies in Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L. REV. 723, 755, 768 (2008) (arguing that 
state tort law is inconsistent and inferior in regulating interactions between government 
officials and individuals.).
106. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1201. 
107. Id. at 1204. The case then settled out of court. Id. at 1202.  Compare a similar 
sequence of cases, where the underlying issue was whether Sliwowski, a school nurse who 
conducted a visual exam of a child’s genital area without consent of the child’s parent violated
the child’s Fourth Amendment rights.  Hearring v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d 275, 278 (2013), 
remanded sub nom. Hearring v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., No. 3:10-cv-
0746, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112241 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2014), overruled sub nom. by 
Hearring v. Sliwowski, 806 F.3d 864 (6th Cir. 2015).  There, the 2013 Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals did not reach the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim, but rather found the 
nurse Sliwowski was entitled to qualified immunity and remanded to the district court. 
Hearring, 712 F.3d at 281–83. On remand, a jury found Sliwowski did not violate the child’s
Fourth Amendment Rights, however, the district court opinion provides no record of what 
standard—“shocks the conscience” or the “fundamental rights”—the jury was instructed
to consider the Fourth Amendment right under. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
Most significantly, the district court issued an injunction against the County, ordering the 
county to train school nurses and personnel on children’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Hearring, LEXIS 112241, at *24–25.  This injunction was subsequently reversed 
762
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The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling, finding that the
“district court misapprehended the legal standard applicable to purported
substantive due process rights that—like the right to consent to medical
treatment for oneself and one’s minor children—may be ‘objectively,
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”108  The court concluded 
that although the “shocks the conscience” standard typically applies to
tortious conduct under the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard does “not 
exhaust the category of protections . . . or eliminate more categorical protection 
for ‘fundamental rights’ as defined by the tradition and experience of the 
nation.”109 
Having emphasized the fundamental liberty of parents to consent, control,
and manage the care of their children, the Tenth Circuit focused its analysis 
for both claims on whether the parents consented to the examinations. 
However, the court stated that even if the parents did not actually consent 
to the exams, so long as it was “objectively reasonable for the official to
believe that the scope of a person’s consent permitted him to conduct the 
search,” then the children’s and parents’ rights would not have been violated.110 
Over the argument of defendants, the court found that the parents did
not in fact consent to the physical and genital exams of their children, and 
furthermore, that it was not reasonable for defendants to believe the parents
consented.111  In reaching its holding, the court analyzed three forms CAP 
by the Sixth Circuit on the grounds that the judge erroneously issued equitable relief
because the jury found no underlying Fourth Amendment violation, because the plaintiffs 
lacked standing to ask for equitable relief, and did not themselves ask for equitable relief 
in their complaint. Hearring, 806 F.3d at 867–68. This string of decisions is important 
because it demonstrates that although the jury ultimately found the genital examination 
did not violate the child’s Fourth Amendment rights, the court clearly believed such types 
of genital examinations should not be conducted without parental consent.  It is for that 
reason the District Court ordered the injunction against the city. Hearring, LEXIS 112241, 
at *24–25. 
108. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1203 (quoting Washington v. Gluksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997));
see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“[T]he interest of parents in the care, 
custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court.”). 
109. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1203. 
110. Id. at 1207 (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)).  Fourth Amendment 
claims are analyzed on the traditional “objective reasonableness” standard, but these
standards have sometimes been relaxed in the school setting.  However, Fourteenth Amendment
claims in school settings are traditionally analyzed under the “shocks the conscience” 
standard.  Nicole Mortorano, Protecting Children’s Rights Inside of the Schoolhouse Gates:
Ending Corporal Punishment in Schools, 102 GEO. L.J. 481, 496 n.106 (2014). 
111. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1212. 
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provided to the parents at the beginning of the school year.112  The first form
titled “Parent Consent Form” contained the parents’ written consent for
specified tests that, “if needed,” would be performed at the school.113  Those
tests included “tuberculosis, speech/language, dental, developmental screening, 
hearing, hemoglobin/HCT, vision screening, and hearing screening.”114 
The second form, titled “Authorization for Treatment of Minors,” required
parental consent for a physician or dentist to diagnose and treat the student, 
and in the case of emergency, transport the child to a medical facility.115 
This second form stated: 
We, the undersigned parent(s) or legal guardian of the minor . . . 
Do hereby authorize any x-ray examination, anesthetic, dental, medical or surgical 
diagnosis or treatment by any physician or dentist licensed by the State of 
Oklahoma . . . . It is understood that this consent is given in advance of any
specific diagnosis or treatment being required, but is given to encourage those 
persons who have temporary custody of the minor, and said physician or dentist 
to exercise his/their best judgment as to the requirements of such diagnosis or
medical or dental or surgical treatment.116 
Analyzing the parental consent form, the Tenth Circuit affirmatively rejected 
defendants’ claim that such a form authorized the physical examinations
of the students: “[p]utting aside the fact that the first paragraph contains
garbled syntax and evidently is missing some words, it does not grant 
consent for the type of examination at issue here.”117  The court ultimately 
found the parents’ written consent applied only to the diagnosis or
treatment—not to the general physical examinations.118  In addition, the
court noted that the consent was expressly for any “physician or dentist”
 112. Id. at 1211–12. 
113. Id. at 1210. 
114. Id. at 1199. 
115. Id. It is neither contested nor criticized that all schools may perform reasonable 
emergency treatment, including transporting a student to the hospital, without parental consent.
See Comm. on Pediatric Emergency Med. and Comm. on Bioethics, Policy Statement—
Consent for Emergency Medical Services for Children and Adolescents, 128 PEDIATRICS
427, 427 (2011). 
116. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1211–12. 
117. Id. at 1212. 
118. Id. at 1211. In the case, CAP administrators argued that “diagnosis” includes 
examination, to which the court responded that “consent forms for parents of children in 
Head Start programs should not be an exercise in obfuscation and misdirection.”  However, the
court did not cite any particular definition for “treatment” or “diagnosis.”  Id. at 1210. 
Compare the dictionary definition of “diagnose” as “to recognize (as a disease) by signs
and symptoms.” MERIAM-WEBSTER MEDICAL DESK DICTIONARY (Rev. ed., 2005) (ebook).
Is it reasonable for an individual to believe this definition of “diagnosis” included physical
examinations? 
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to diagnose or treat the child, while in the current case, CAP employed two 
nurses to conduct the exams.119 
The court could have held that, although the parents did not consent to 
general physical exams of children, it nonetheless may have been reasonable 
for CAP administrators to believe that the examinations were within the 
scope of parental consent.  Yet, the court affirmatively declined such a
finding.  The court instead stated that, “[t]he question is what a ‘typical
reasonable person’ would understand from the form[,]” and did not agree 
with the district court that there was no issue of material fact regarding 
“the objective reasonableness of CAP’s belief that it had consent based on 
these forms.”120  The Tenth Circuit found that parental consent did not in
fact cover the physical examinations, nor could the administrators have 
reasonably believed the consent covered the physical examinations, and 
reversed and remanded the parents’ due process violation claim.121 
A court adjudicating ten-year-old Grace’s claim from Coffee County, 
Georgia is in the Eleventh Circuit and therefore not bound by Dubbs v. Head
Start. However, many Eleventh Circuit opinions acknowledge parents’
rights to control and manage the medical treatment of their children,122 
and Dubbs is nonetheless persuasive.  In analyzing Grace’s mother’s claims, 
several points of analysis are important under Dubbs: first, whether the strict
Fourteenth Amendment “shocks the conscience” standard applies, or a
more liberal standard for “fundamental rights”; second, whether the nurse 
objectively believed the treatment was within the scope of the consent Grace’s
mother provided; and third, whether relief will be barred by qualified
immunity. 
119. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1211–12.  This point is relevant in the current discussion of
school-based telemedicine. Some of the current telemedicine consent forms provide long
lists of health care providers, ranging from doctors, to physicians assistants and even college 
interns. See Coffee Consent Form, supra note 95. 
120. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1211.  The court also noted that the plaintiff’s expert doctor
testified that a reasonable physician would have understood that the consent forms provided
would not have included onsite physical examinations. Id. 
121. Id. at 1222. 
122. See e.g., Doe v. Pub. Health Tr., 696 F.2d 901, 909 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged the constitutional stature of the family, and
of the parent-child relationship.”); see also Robertson v. Hecksel, 420 F.3d 1254, 1257
(11th Cir. 2005) (“A parent’s due process right in the care, custody, and control of her children
is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme]
Court.’” (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000))). 
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1. Fourteenth Amendment Standard
The first and perhaps most important part of the Tenth Circuit’s holding
is that an action for a violation of a substantive due process “fundamental
right” may not be analyzed under the “shocks the conscience” standard.123 
Five years after Dubbs, the Tenth Circuit affirmed that “the ‘shocks the 
conscience’ and ‘fundamental liberty’ tests are two separate approaches
to analyzing governmental action under the Fourteenth Amendment.”124 
However, the court explained that the two standards “are not mutually
exclusive[.] Courts should not unilaterally choose to consider only one or 
the other of the two strands.  Both approaches may well be applied in any
given case.”125  Notably in Dubbs, the appellate court did not make its own 
finding on whether the physical examinations violated such a standard, nor 
did it expressly overrule the district court’s finding that the genital examinations
did not shock the conscience of the court.126 
Many courts still apply the “shocks the conscience” standard to Fourteenth 
Amendment fundamental right cases, rather than the less stringent standard 
applied in Dubbs.127  In an Eleventh Circuit case, K.A. ex rel. J.A. v. Abington 
Heights School District, a high school administrator detained a student 
who later claimed his fundamental right to liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment was violated.128  The court stated that, “[d]eprivation violates 
due process only when it shocks the conscience, which encompasses only
the most egregious official conduct.”129  Similarly, in the Third Circuit case
McCurdy v. Dodd, the court held that “[i]n the context of parental liberty
interests . . . the Due Process Clause only protects against deliberate violations 
of a parent’s fundamental rights––that is, where the state action at issue was 
specifically aimed at interfering with protected aspects of the parent-child 
123. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1203. 
124. See Miller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 769 (10th Cir. 2008).  Negligence 
alone is insufficient to meet the “shocks the conscience” standard. In P.J. ex rel. Jensen 
v. Utah, the court even held that “an intentional or reckless abuse of power that causes the
plaintiff injury does not, of itself, meet the ‘shocks the conscience’ standard. Rather, there 
must be ‘a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is
truly conscience shocking.’”  No. 2:05-CV-739 TS, 2008 WL 4372933, at *15 (D. Utah 
Sept. 22, 2008). 
125. See Miller, 528 F.3d at 769. 
126. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1203. 
127. Some have criticized the use of the “shocks the conscience” standard.  See, e.g., 
Rosalie B. Levinson, Time to Bury the Shocks the Conscience Test, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 307, 
315 (2010) (arguing that where fundamental rights are concerned, the court should not
exclusively look at the shocks the conscience standard).
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relationship.”130  Finally, in Adkins v. Luzerne County Children & Youth
Services, a case in which a father lost custody of his children, the federal 
district court held that the social worker’s conduct in removing the children
“was not grossly negligent or so arbitrary as to ‘shock the conscience.’”131 
These cases demonstrate that courts do not typically evaluate a parent’s
right to control the custody or care of his or her children under a less-
demanding “fundamental right” standard; rather, courts continue to evaluate
these claims under the “shocks the conscience” standard.  Although the district
court in Dubbs found that the physical examinations of the preschoolers did
not shock the conscience of the court, the appellate court declined to apply
the facts to this standard.132 
2. Form Analysis: The Issue of Consent 
The next point of analysis is whether Grace’s mother, by signing the 
telemedicine form, consented to the genital examination.  More specifically, 
the issue is whether the Head Start Administrator’s belief that the consent
obtained on the form covered a genital examination was objectively reasonable. 
As instructed by Dubbs, the objective standard asks what a typical reasonable
person would have understood the forms to authorize during the examination.133 
Most importantly, in situations where the wording is ambiguous, the court 
in Dubbs held the “common-law rule to construe ambiguous language against 
the interest of the party that drafted it”134 applied to interpreting these type
of consent forms. Therefore, where it is ambiguous as to whether the form 
objectively encompassed parents’ consent, a court will be inclined to interpret 
the form in favor of the parent. 
The Coffee County consent form authorizes any “physician or designated 
health/mental health professional (nurse practitioners, physician assistants, 
college student interns, etc.) working for the clinic to provide such medical 
tests, procedures, and treatments as are reasonably necessary or advisable
130.  McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 827–28 (3d Cir. 2003). 
131.  No. 3:CV-01-0470, 2005 WL 2129921, at *22 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2005). 
132. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1211 (10th Cir. 2003).  Even if it was
clear a “shocks the conscience” standard applies, the standard itself has not been applied
uniformly amongst cases.  See Clifford B. Levine, United Artists: Reviewing the Conscience
Shocking Test Under Section 1983, 1 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 101, 112–15 (2005) (noting 
the varying interpretation of the “shocks the conscience” standard and how a majority of
courts may apply an “improper motive” test).
133. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1211. 
134. Id. at 1205. 
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for the medical evaluation and management of my child’s health or mental 
health care.”135  The “reasonably necessary or advisable” language used here
is notably vague.136  In the medical context, the scope of “reasonably necessary”
can be read both narrowly and broadly.  “Necessary” invokes a requirement 
of immediacy and severity.137  The question then becomes how liberally or 
narrowly the court will interpret “necessary.”138  For example, testing for sexually 
transmitted diseases is certainly necessary in terms of severity, but may
not be immediately necessary.  It is hard to think of a medical situation where 
treatment could not be argued to be “reasonably necessary or advisable.”
Additional factors may also affect a determination of reasonableness.
It is fair to speculate that the reasonableness of a telemedicine treatment
may change if the case involved a female nurse conducting a genital 
examination of a twelve-year-old boy rather than a five-year-old girl. 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that the age and gender
of a child is important in analyzing unreasonable search and seizure claims.139 
Consider a situation where a parent has two children, a daughter and a son,
and although the parent would sign the exact same form for both children, the
form may permit different services for each child based on the circumstantial
reasonableness.
Telemedicine consent forms also authorize mental health services.140 
Although providing mental health services without parental notification 
135. Coffee Consent Form, supra note 95. 
136. Author Ken Adams criticizes the ambiguity of the phrase “reasonably necessary.”
He argues that “[s]omething is necessary, or it’s not. What purposes does reasonably
serve?”  Ken Adams, Using “Reasonable” and “Reasonably” in Contracts, ADAMS ON
CONTRACT DRAFTING (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.adamsdrafting.com/using-reasonable-
and-reasonably-in-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/7B8C-SS4J].  Indeed, the goal of training
school employees on Fourth Amendment searches at school is to remove the subjective
interpretation of what is “reasonable”: “to ensure that the children’s Fourth Amendment
rights are not subject to the discretion of the school official in the field.” Hearring v. Metro. 
Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., No. 3:10-cv-0746, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112241, 
at * 24 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 8, 2014). 
137. Necessary, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 776 (10th ed. 1997) 
(“Indispensable, essential.”). 
138. For a statutory definition of “medically necessary” see N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 18 § 513.1(c) (2011) (“Necessary to prevent, diagnose, correct or cure a condition” to 
“restore the recipient to his or her best possible functional level; or improve the recipient’s 
capacity for normal activity.”).
139. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1984) (“[N]ot excessively intrusive
in light of the age and sex of the student[.]”); Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 
557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009) (noting the same).
140. School Based Wellness Center Telemedicine Program, HOWARD CTY. SCH.
HEALTH DEP’T, http://sfes.hcpss.org/sites/default/files/SBWC%20Telemedicine%20Consent% 
20Form%2006-25-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/GDW3-BA32] (last visited July 29, 2016) 
[hereinafter Howard Consent Form]; see Coffee Consent Form, supra note 95. 
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may not violate a student’s Fourth Amendment rights,141 they may violate
a parent’s due process rights if the treatment exceeded the scope of the 
parent’s consent. Consider the real-life example of a mother who found
out her son’s school selected him to participate in group therapy sessions 
for children with divorced parents.142  The mother had no idea this therapy 
was taking place.143 A nurse or teacher may have believed the therapy was
“reasonably necessary or advisable,” possibly because the child was acting 
out in class or expressed emotions about his parents’ divorce.  Under the 
Dubbs analysis, the issue for the court would be whether the “reasonably 
necessary” language on the consent form objectively encompassed the 
mother’s consent. The mother would likely be justified in believing the 
medical consent form she signed at the beginning of the school year did
not encompass such mental health treatment. 
The Coffee County consent form is not alone in its ambiguous reach. 
A consent form for a school district in Howard County, Maryland uses 
similar language.144  The consent form states that “[s]chool-Based Wellness
Center telemedicine services may include, but are not limited to . . . [m]edical
care and treatment, including diagnosis of acute and chronic illness and 
disease . . . .”145 Similarly, a telemedicine consent form in Jeff Davis County,
141.  This would likely not be a “search or seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. 
142. This is a true story told by a mother at the Legislative Hearing for Nebraska 
Legislative Bill 556.  While the counseling sessions in that case did not involve a therapist 
providing services via telemedicine, it is easy to change the facts to create a hypothetical
in which the therapist runs the treatment group via telemedicine rather than in person. The 
mother in Nebraska expressed that: 
I was not once informed that my child was going to be in this class.  I was livid,
and my school administrators heard about it immediately. . . .  But that is something
that I want to see in [the Nebraska Telemedicine Bill], that it’s enforced that it 
has to be a parental consent, because there can’t be closed-door meetings, . . .  
I’m the parent.  I work very, very hard and I love my children and I believe that 
all of you that are parents love your children and you know what’s best for your
children.  But I’m the parent for my children.
Hearing on Legis. B. 556, supra note 83, at 10 (statement of Christine Bates).  Similarly,
the National Association of School Nurses released a position statement on students’
mental health, advocated that school medicine should “promote family-centered care by
connecting parents and children with school and community resources for mental health 
services and monitoring continued treatment and follow-up.  By joining forces with other
health professionals in the school and the community, school nurses can act as strong
advocates for child mental health programs in the political and public arena.”  NAT’L ASS’N 
OF SCH. NURSES, supra note 92. 
143. Id.
 144. Howard Consent Form, supra note 140 (emphasis added). 
145. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Georgia instructs parents to “authorize any physician or physician-designated
health professional working for the clinic to provide such medical tests, 
procedures, and treatments as are reasonably necessary or advisable for 
the medical evaluation and health care management of the child listed
above.”146 Still another consent form from the Yancy and Mitchell County
School Districts in rural Tennessee requires the parent to “consent in advance 
to [his or her] child having access to any or all-available services . . . .”147  Like
the Coffee County form, none of the above forms require the school to
contact a parent before the nurse provides treatment or evaluation.148 
Analyzing these three parental consent forms under substantive due 
process and Fourth Amendment claims, the critical question is whether a 
typical reasonable person would believe the genital examination was 
“reasonably necessary,” as stated on the form.  Furthermore, pursuant to 
Dubbs, if the court finds the consent form language ambiguous, the court 
will construe all ambiguities against the drafter.149 
The Dubbs court also found that although the Head Start consent forms 
may have authorized doctors or dentists to diagnose and treat the preschool 
students, the form said nothing about nurses providing treatment,150 showing
just how strictly a court will interpret the scope of consent.  The Coffee 
County form provides a wide range of physicians that may consult with the
students in Georgia, including doctors, registered nurses, physician assistants, 
and even college interns.151 However, other consent forms—like those 
provided in Maryland—do not provide a similar list.152 
The vague language used in many telemedicine parental consent forms 
fails to adequately inform parents of the medical and mental health treatment 
that a nurse may administer to their children.  The “reasonably necessary”
language is open to much speculation and interpretation. What could be 
reasonable for a female nurse to provide a five-year-old girl may not be
reasonable for her thirteen-year-old brother—yet their parent would sign 
the same consent form for both children.  Furthermore, courts may interpret
 146. Student Enrollment Packet, JEFF DAVIS CTY. 3 (2015–2016), https://www.jeff-
davis.k12.ga.us/images/docs/services/forms/Student%20Enrollment%20Packet.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8CL7-5AMC].
147. Minor Patient Registration, MY HEALTH-E-SCHOOLS, http://crhi.org/docs/2013% 
20Combined%20Student%20Enrollment.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRE6-RUS5] (last visited
July 30, 2016) (emphasis added). 
148.  Although not provided on the actual consent form, the provider’s website does 
state that parents will be contacted before the child sees a physician. Frequently Asked
Questions About Telemedicine, CTR. FOR RURAL HEALTH INNOVATION, http://crhi.org/
faq.html [https://perma.cc/TZ3E-GKSW] (last visited July 30, 2016). 
149.  Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1208 (10th Cir. 2003). 
150. Id. at 1212. 
151. Coffee Consent Form, supra note 95. 
152. Howard Consent Form, supra note 140. 
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“reasonably necessary” liberally to include treatment of illnesses that are 
necessary in the broad sense of the idea that it is necessary to treat eventually, 
but may not be immediately necessary.  Based on how broadly or narrowly
the court interprets the form, a nurse may be justified in placing the student
in counseling sessions with a psychiatrist or many other situations a parent
never contemplated when signing the consent form at the beginning of the 
school year. Because of the potential ambiguity in telemedicine consent
forms, anything short of notifying parents immediately before the exam
runs the risk of violating both parents’ substantive due process and children’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.
3. Qualified Immunity 
If the trier of fact finds that a constitutional violation actually occurred, 
the qualified immunity doctrine presents a second hurdle for relief.153 Under 
the qualified immunity doctrine, a government official will be liable for
constitutional violations brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the right 
was “clearly established” in the circumstances of the case.154  While the
doctrine serves to allow government officials to exercise reasonable discretion
without fear of punishment, it can also bar injured parties from obtaining 
relief.155 
153. Traditionally, the court has chosen to consider qualified immunity first. Hunter
v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam) (noting that because qualified immunity
is intended to grant immunity from suit and not just a defense, the court has repeatedly
“stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in
litigation.”  (citations omitted)).  However, some courts will rule on the merits before analyzing 
a qualified immunity defense.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001) (establishing 
a two-pronged inquiry for suits involving qualified immunity, wherein courts must first 
consider the merits of the constitutional claim before analyzing a defendant’s claim of 
qualified immunity), receded from by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding 
that “the Saucier protocol should not be regarded as mandatory in all cases . . . [although] 
it is often beneficial.”).  For a detailed discussion of the debate that this issue has raised 
amongst scholars, see James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma:
Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601 (2011). 
154. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
155. See John C. Williams, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 
1297 (2012).  In his article, John Jefferies similarly argues that there is a “lack of fit” 
between the qualified immunity doctrine and constitutional rights: “[q]ualified immunity
works less well for other rights. It works least well when constitutional doctrine is stated
at a very high level of generality, unaccompanied by particularizing doctrine.  As applied
to those rights, qualified immunity can be analytically troubling.”  John C. Jefferies Jr., 
What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 859–60 (2010). 
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In Hearring v. Sliwowski, the Sixth Circuit sought to determine whether 
it was clearly established that a school nurse’s medical treatment had to
be “reasonable”––a standard required for other Fourth Amendment searches.156 
In Hearring, a school nurse conducted a genital visual examination of a 
six-year-old girl without obtaining consent from her parent.157  The student’s 
mother brought a claim alleging the exam was in violation of the student’s 
Fourth Amendment right.158  The court accepted the nurse’s qualified 
immunity defense and declined to reach the merits of the case.159 The court 
found that although the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard did
in fact apply to medical treatment rendered by a school nurse, that
standard was not “clearly established” in that circuit’s precedent, finding 
in favor of the defendant nurse.160 
In PJ v. Wagner, the Tenth Circuit similarly addressed the qualified 
immunity defense when it considered whether two parents’ substantive 
due process rights to control the medical treatment of their child were clearly 
established.161  In that case, the parents refused to consent to chemotherapy 
for their son, despite multiple doctors advising that chemotherapy was
necessary to save his life.162 Against the will of the parents, the juvenile
court ordered the child to undergo chemotherapy.163  The parents brought
suit against the government officials and doctors who participated in the 
treatment.164 The court held that the right of a parent to control the medical
treatment of their son in the case’s specific facts was not clearly established, 
and therefore the qualified immunity defense applied.165 
Both Wagner and Hearring demonstrate that although the substantive 
due process right to control the medical treatment of one’s child is a well-
established right, the unique jurisdiction and circumstances of each case
may result in a court finding that the right was not so “clearly established”
that the defendant would not have reasonably known that his or her conduct
was unlawful.166  The court adjudicating Grace’s mother’s claims—asking 
whether the school nurse was entitled to qualified immunity—would consider
both the jurisdiction and the unique circumstances of the case in deciding 
156. 
157. 
 Hearring v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d 275, 279 (6th Cir. 2013). 
Id. at 277. 
158. Id.
 159. Id.
 160. Id. at 282. 
 161.  PJ v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2010). 
162.  Id. at 1188. 
163. Id. at 1190. 
164. Id. at 1194–95. 
165. Id. at 1201. 
166. See Jefferies, supra note 155, at 858–59. 
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whether it was clearly established that her actions violated the Fourth
Amendment or the mother’s substantive due process rights.167 
The degree and type of liability facing the providing doctors is also
uncertain. As previously stated, due process and the Fourth Amendment 
only apply to the actions of public officials.  While the court considered the
nurses in Dubbs to be public officials because they were health department 
employees,168 doctors providing telemedicine services are typically not
employed by the school, but are independent contractors with private
telemedicine companies.169  Therefore, the court would likely not consider
a doctor providing telemedicine services a “public official,” and his actions
would not be subject to either the Fourth Amendment or due process claims.170 
All things considered, the outcome of Grace’s mother’s claims is unclear, 
as the analytical journey under Dubbs is wrought with many uncertainties. 
First, the court may choose to adopt the Fourteenth Amendment “shocks 
the conscience” or the “fundamental rights” standard of review.  Second, 
the court may find the nurse’s actions were objectively within the “reasonably 
necessary” requirement as provided on the parental consent form.171  Finally, 
the court may apply the qualified immunity doctrine and find that Grace’s
rights were not clearly established in the specific jurisdiction or context
 167. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 746 (2011) (“When faced with inconsistent
legal rules in different jurisdictions,” public officials “should be given some deference for 
qualified immunity purposes, at least if they implement policies consistent with the governing 
law of the jurisdiction where the action is taken.”).  Of further note is what type of damages 
or relief a plaintiff pursuing a constitutional claim of this sort is seeking.  James Pfander 
suggests that when a plaintiff seeks only nominal relief, the qualified immunity defense 
should not apply because defendants do not face real liability.  Pfander, supra note 153, at 
1622–23. 
168.  Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir. 2003). 
169. See Nathaniel M. Lacktman, Telemedicine Providers: Are My Doctors Employees
or Independent Contractors?, HEALTH CARE LAW TODAY (July 7, 2015), https://www.health
carelawtoday.com/2015/07/07/telemedicine-providers-are-my-doctors-employees-or-
independent-contractors/ [https://perma.cc/RV37-Z9E4].
170. See Andrew W. Weis, Qualified Immunity for “Private” § 1983 Defendants After 
Filarsky v. Delia, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1037, 1062–64 (2013). 
171. A traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, which in the context of searches at
schools usually involves school staff searching for illegal drugs or weapons, requires the 
court to analyze the reasonableness of the search.  An article by Aileen Che illustrates the 
importance of students’ bodily integrity, that although “students have a diminished expectation
of privacy once they enter school premises, . . . students still have a significant privacy 
interest in their bodies.”  Aileen Che, Is the Fourth Amendment Failing Our Students?, 29 
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 89, 90 (2009). 
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V. THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM STANDARD
State legislatures should begin to draft legislation requiring schools to 
notify parents and obtain parental consent immediately prior to providing 
telemedicine services at school, or alternatively, require consent forms not 
including any “reasonably necessary” or “not limited to” language.172 
State legislatures, not Congress, should be the bodies to enact mandatory 
parental consent legislation.173  While Congress may regulate some medical
areas under the Commerce Clause, the majority of medical lawmaking and 
enforcement is left to the individual states and state medical boards.174 
Telemedicine regulation regarding parental consent should be uniform
across the states in order to accomplish the goal of providing assurance
for both parents and health care providers that all telemedicine services are
consented to. 
The parental consent requirements should be uniform because substantive
due process and Fourth Amendment rights apply equally across the United 
States.  This is significant because, as previously discussed, relief for
violations of these universal rights under the qualified immunity doctrine 
may depend on whether the right was “clearly established” in a particular 
jurisdiction.175 If every state required parental consent before a physician 
provided telemedicine services, the laws of that state would guarantee 
relief for parents and children, and thus, parents would not need to bring 
a constitutional rights claim subject to the shifting “clearly established” 
172. Legislatures are both expanding and restricting telemedicine use.  For example,
a federal district court recently enjoined the Texas Medical Board from enforcing a law 
that bars physicians from using telemedicine to prescribe medication when the physician
has never met the patient in person.  Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529
(W.D. Tex. 2015); see Dionne Lomax & Kate F. Stewart, Injunction Blocks Implementation of
Texas Telemedicine Regulations, NAT’L L. REV. (June 4, 2015), http://www.natlawreview. 
com/article/injunction-blocks-implementation-texas-telemedicine-regulations#sthash.R4naI 
vOo.dpuf [https://perma.cc/L26H-BGNN].
173. Issues in telemedicine regulation have invited debates as to whether physician’s 
licenses should be nationally regulated, or left to state legislators. See Carl F. Ameringer, 
State-Based Licensure of Telemedicine: The Need for Uniformity but Not a National Scheme, 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 55, 62 (2011) (arguing that federal regulation of telemedicine 
licensures would be too difficult to implement and should be left to state medical boards); 
see also Susan E. Volkert, Telemedicine: RX for the Future of Health Care, 6 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 147, 174 (2000) (addressing various proposals for a national telemedicine 
licensure scheme). 
174. See Drew Carlson & James N. Thompson, The Role of State Medical Boards, 7
AMA J. OF ETHICS (Apr. 2005), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2005/04/pfor1-0504.html. 
175. See supra Part IV.B.3.
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standard. Furthermore, different jurisdictions may choose to analyze a 
substantive claim based on either the traditional and high “shocks the
conscience” standard or the more liberal “fundamental rights” standard. 
Establishing a uniform standard requiring schools to notify parents and 
obtain their consent prior to telemedicine treatment will eliminate these 
potential problems.  Additionally, uniformity across the states is important
because students may commute across state boundaries to go to school, or
may attend a school in a bi-state school district.176  If every state had the same
requirements, parents would know the same standards apply regardless of 
where they live and where their child attends school.  Furthermore,
telemedicine services are unique in that they have a greater ability to provide
treatment across state boundaries.177  A uniform consent standard would
facilitate the practice of a physician in Alabama who provides telemedicine
services to a school in Arkansas and may not know what parental consent 
standards he must adhere to.178  The requirement that physicians must be
licensed in the state where they practice telemedicine largely remains 
unchanged.179  However, in some instances, physicians may counsel patients
in a state where they do not hold a medical license.180 
176. The Delmar School District in southwest Delaware is home to both Delaware
and Maryland. Our History, DELMAR SCH. DIST., http://www.delmar.k12.de.us/apps/pages/
index.jsp?uREC_ID=275974&type=d [https://perma.cc/4YB4-NHQV] (last visited July 30,
2016).
177. While there is great potential for telemedicine to be used across state lines, individual
state rules and regulations make doing so difficult. LATOYA THOMAS & GARY CAPISTRANT,
50 STATE TELEMEDICINE GAPS ANALYSIS, PHYSICIAN PRACTICE STANDARDS & LICENSURE
9 (May 2015), http://www.americantelemed.org/docs/default-source/policy/50-state-tele 
medicine-gaps-analysis—physician-practice-standards-licensure.pdf?sfvrsn=14 [https://perma.
cc/TN8B-AG65].
178. Issues of consent have also been analyzed under medical malpractice law.  Fleisher
and Dechene discuss the issue of medical consent as it applies to tort, noting that the
practice of telemedicine “raises novel informed consent issues and more than one type of 
consent may be necessary.” LYNN D. FLEISHER & JAMES C. DECHENE, TELEMEDICINE AND
E-HEALTH LAW 1–54 (2006). 
179. Credentialing and Licensing, TELEHEALTH RES. CTR., http://www.telehealth 
resourcecenter.org/toolbox-module/credentialing-and-licensing#do-the-telemedicine-
providers-have-to-be-credentia [https://perma.cc/YC4R-39HP] (last visited July 30, 2016). 
However, there are advancements towards recognizing multi-state licenses. See FED’N OF
STATE MED. BOARDS, INTERSTATE MEDICAL LICENSURE COMPACT REPRESENTATIVES
GATHER FOR INAUGURAL MEETING (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.fsmb.org/Media/Default/
PDF/Publications/compact_commission_meeting_oct2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/UB6E-A3A8].
180. TELEHEALTH RES. CTR, supra note 179. 
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Recent debate on the standard of care and licensure to practice telemedicine 
has mostly suggested that the location of the patient, not the physician,
controls the applicable standard of care.181  The issue of consent would likely 
follow this pattern, applying the rules and requirements of the patient’s, not
the physician’s state.182  A uniform standard would similarly assure parents that
no matter which state their child attends school in, their right to consent is
supported by state statutory law. 
Finally, a uniform standard requiring parental consent immediately before
telemedicine treatment is provided will protect the autonomy of parents
whose children are in private school. The United States Supreme Court 
decisions in New Jersey v. T.L.O. and subsequent cases have maintained 
that Fourth Amendment claims only apply to employees of public schools 
and not private schools.183  Justice Scalia stated that when parents enroll their 
children in private school, private school officials “stand in loco parentis
over the children entrusted to them.  In fact, the tutor or schoolmaster is the
very prototype of that status.”184 By sending their child to a private school, 
parents in essence provide an automatic layer of consent.  Likewise, a private
actor cannot violate parents’ substantive due process rights to control the 
medical care or education of their child.185  Although a parent of a private
school student may not be able to bring constitutional violation claims, 
that parent’s interest in controlling the medical care of his or her child is 
just as strong as parents of public school students.186  A uniform standard 
requiring parental consent to telemedicine services would therefore
additionally serve to protect the interests of parents at private schools who 
might otherwise not have a claim.
A. Proposed Legislation 
The following text is a model framework for state legislators to adopt 
into the states’ health, family or education codes,187 and apply to all schools
utilizing telemedicine services.
 181. Ameringer, supra note 173, at 58. 
182. Id.
 183. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1984); see Safford Unified Sch.
Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009). 
184.  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–55 (1995). 
185. See Jack M. Beermann, Why Do Plaintiffs Sue Private Parties Under Section 
1983?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 9, 11 (2005). 
186. As the California Children’s Partnership emphasizes, regardless of public or private
nature of the school, “it is critical that programs communicate with parents before and after
the telehealth visit and help parents access any needed follow-up care.”  CHILDREN’S P’SHIP, supra
note 1, at 10. 
187. However, in his article, Carl Ameringer examines how overlooking state medical
board administration may impede well-intentioned public policy because of the state medical
776
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I am the parent/guardian of ______________________ (minor’s name).  I 
_______________ (Give/ Do Not Give) consent for _______________ (Child’s
Name) to be evaluated and diagnosed in the school-based telemedicine program 
operated by the school nurse at_____________(elementary/middle/high school).
In the event the school nurse believes it would be beneficial for my child to have
a telemedicine consultation with a physician, registered nurse, or physicians’
assistant, the school nurse will contact me and obtain my consent. The nurse will
specify the type of treatment and the name of the physician.  Although I am not 
required to be physically present for the treatment of my child, I understand that
I am encouraged to participate in my child’s medical treatment as much as possible. 
I understand that telemedicine services will not be provided before I am 
contacted and consent to the treatment.  However, in case of a medical emergency, all 
services reasonably necessary will be administered for the health and safety of my
child even if I cannot be contacted. 
I further understand that I may withdraw my consent for my child to be eligible
for telemedicine services at any time during the school year. 
Other policy makers have suggested similar requirements.188 
Alternatively, the telemedicine form could provide an enumerated and 
finite list of services that may be rendered in school-based telemedicine. 
As illustrated in Dubbs, where the parental consent form provided a limited 
list of medical treatment options, a school or medical care provider could 
not exceed that list without violating constitutional rights.189  Where there
is a finite list of services and no ambiguous “reasonably necessary” or “not
limited to” language that is open for interpretation, the rights of parents to
control the medical care of their children would be similarly protected. 
board’s primary role in protecting consumers. While Ameringer’s argument is focused on the 
issue of national telemedicine physician licensure, here also, implementing consent standards
should take into account the important role the medical board plays in managing medical
practice. Leaving the rules and regulations up to the Department of Health and Human Services
or State Department of Education may overlook the significant role of the medical board
in providing consumer protection for medical services. Ameringer, supra note 173, at 70. 
188. 	  Spaulding et al., supra note 20, at 307. One protocol procedure provides that 
[i]f the child has a fever, contact parent and advise physician’s care or offer telemedicine 
consult. a. If the parent agrees to the telemedicine consult, [1] perform a rapid
strep test [2] proceed with routine process to schedule a telemedicine visit b. If
the parent does not want to schedule a telemedicine visit, ask the parent to make 
arrangements for the child to return home and again, advise physician’s care. 
Id. 
189. See supra Part IV.B. 
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B. Potential Counterarguments 
Requiring schools to obtain parental consent immediately before a student 
is provided with telemedicine services could diminish some of its benefits. 
Certainly, it would be reasonable to contend that if a parent is unable
to answer his or her phone while at work, or if the parent does not have a 
cell phone, the nurse might hold the student out of class for a longer time 
than what would be ideal.190 However, requiring schools to contact parents
immediately before medical treatment is provided, or alternatively, sign a 
form authorizing a limited number of telemedicine services, would not 
result in throwing the baby out with the bathwater.  The parent would still 
not be required to miss work, and once the parent could be contacted and 
give permission, the child would be able to see a physician without waiting 
for the parent to come to the school.  The balancing of interests in this case, 
keeping the child in the nurse’s office for an extra half hour, or providing
medical treatment a parent is not aware of and did not consent to, is not 
ultimately a very persuasive argument to forego seeking parental consent.191 
Furthermore, there are additional positive benefits in requiring schools 
to contact parents and obtain consent immediately prior to providing
telemedicine services.  When the school nurse speaks with a parent, the nurse 
not only obtains the parent’s consent, but can also ask about any health 
concerns the child has had in the last few days, potential illnesses the child’s 
siblings might currently have, or a number of other things that would be 
relevant to providing care.  The parent would also be able to talk to the child,
providing therapeutic support for treatment that might be more invasive
190. One of the primary objectives and benefits of school-based telemedicine is to
keep healthy children in their classrooms for as much time as possible.  However, this
would not be the first time that protecting a constitutional right results in inefficient or
costly side effects. See e.g., Harold L. Holliday & David Whipple, Free Speech and the 
Right of Municipalities to Regulate the Use of Public Places, U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 191, 
202–04 (1950) (discussing the sometimes costly and inconvenient action police officers
and municipalities must take in order to protect an individual’s freedom of expression);
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1976) (“[T]he cost of protecting a constitutional right 
cannot justify its total denial.”); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (striking 
down social security regulations that violated equal protection, where “administrative
efficiency” was the sole justification for the regulations).  Here too, the fact that protecting 
a constitutional right comes with costs, or is not in every way “efficient,” does not justify
denying the right. 
191. See supra note 190.  The court has placed a high value on the parent’s interest, 
holding such parental rights are “objectively deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.” Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 
503 U.S. 115 (1992); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
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to the child’s privacy. Finally, the parent would be able to speak with the 
health care provider and hopefully establish a more primary care relationship.192 
Other scholars have argued that requiring a parent to consent to medical 
treatment could complicate or confuse laws which enable minors of a certain 
age to seek medical services related to pregnancy or drug and alcohol
treatment.193  Generally, nurses are free to counsel a teenage student about
resources available to him or her regarding sexually transmitted diseases or 
pregnancy;194 however, this would not change under this Comment’s proposal.
Rather, the consent requirements this Comment proposes would have the
effect of maintaining the current status quo.  Minors of a certain majority
age would continue to be able to seek medical counsel and services from the
school nurse regarding pregnancy or substance abuse issues as provided
by law.195 
Finally, the proposed legislation includes a “reasonableness” standard for 
emergency situations, which may similarly lead to subjective judgments as
to whether something is an emergency.196 However, the emergency clause
must be included despite possible inconsistencies because emergency care
and the transportation of a child to a hospital or physician has always been 
allowed and expected even if a parent cannot be reached.197 
192. As part of the new Texas legislation, the hope of legislators was not just for the 
child to see the physician during one isolated telemedicine meeting, but to establish a 
regular primary care relationship and conduct appropriate follow-up care.  See H.B. 1878, 
84th Leg., 2015 Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015); see also Spaulding et al., supra note 20, at 283–84
(noting that when the child has a primary care physician, the telemedicine provider should 
be in communication with that physician).
193. See Hanisco, supra note 53, at 905. 
194. See Camille Waters, A, B, C’s and Condoms For Free: A Legislative Solution
To Parents’ Rights and Condom Distribution in Public Schools, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 787, 
788 (1997).
195. See supra p. 754 and note 57. 
196. See e.g., Tyler Pratt, The Fourth Amendment’s Shortcomings for Police during 
School Shootings, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1095, 1141 (2009) (discussing the subjectivity problems 
that arise with the “reasonableness test” in law enforcement responses). 
197. The Council on School Health recommends that in an event of an emergency
where the child needs to be transported to the hospital, a school staff member accompanies
the child and assumes in loco parentis status (in absence of the parent).  Council on School 
Health, Medical Emergencies Occurring at School, 122 PEDIATRICS 887, 890 (2008).  The 
loco in parentis doctrine may also justify the school taking custodial care of a child’s 
safety.  See Alysa B. Koloms, Stripping Down the Reasonableness Standard: The Problems 
with Using In Loco Parentis to Define Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights, 39 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 169, 170 n.8, 184–85 (2010). 
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Telemedicine has and will continue to benefit children,198 parents, schools 
and entire communities through school-based care.199 The primary purpose 
of telemedicine in schools—to increase classroom seat time200—will not
be diminished by requiring schools to contact parents immediately before 
telemedicine services are offered, or by requiring that all consent forms
contain a finite and limited list of services. Such consent requirements will
secure the administration of basic health care needs for children—like
testing for strep and monitoring a child’s asthma—and protect parental rights
to control their children’s medical care and children’s rights to be free from
unreasonable searches protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
The valuable partnership goal of schools and the health care community
to reach underprivileged and isolated children should continue to develop 
without jeopardizing fundamental constitutional rights. Implementing
a uniform standard amongst states and requiring schools to contact parents 
immediately before a physician provides telemedicine services—or alternatively,
requiring all telemedicine consent forms provide a limited list of services 
—will allow parents to make the most informed decisions about their children’s
health care and will assure that doctors and nurses act with appropriate 
consent. 
198. Danielle Abril, Exclusive: Children’s Health Telehealth Pilot Leads to Rollout at 57
North Texas Schools, DALL. BUS. J. (Aug. 13, 2015, 12:06 PM), http://www.bizjournals. 
com/dallas/blog/techflash/2015/08/childrens-health-telehealth-pilot-leads-to-rollout.html. 
199. See CHILDREN’S P’SHIP, supra note 1, at 1. 
200. See Wicklund, supra note 26. 
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